In 1651, the English philosopher Thomas Hobbes imagined life in the “state of nature”—that is, a world without governing institutions and guardrails. This world was a bleak one, enveloped in a constant state of war that rendered life “nasty, brutish, and short.” Hobbes envisaged a Leviathan, an all-powerful sovereign, as the only means to tame this state of nature. The post-World War II rules-based order, defined and led by the United States, was the modern alternative.
Today, we are undergoing a grand experiment testing the impact of moving away from those rules. As I’ve discussed at length recently, we have already witnessed the death of the global trading system as we have known it. But this slide away from the rules-based system isn’t limited to trade. It is evident in the use of military force as well.
Three examples of unilateral military action over the past couple weeks are particularly instructive:
First, late Tuesday night, Russia launched more than a dozen one-way attack drones, which entered Polish airspace and crashed on Polish soil—soil we are bound to protect under the NATO charter. Make no mistake: Russia has been intently testing the rules-based system—and the prime directive of that system, that states should not use military force to change borders and acquire territory—since 2014 when it invaded Crimea, and again in 2022 when it launched its full-fledged invasion of Ukraine. Yet, this week, for the first time in the alliance’s history, NATO fighter jets were scrambled to shoot down enemy air assets over NATO airspace. Whether the strike was intentional or unintentional, the Russians have failed to offer an explanation or an apology; instead, Belarusian military officials claimed, in the Russians’ place, that the Ukrainian electronic warfare systems caused the drones to veer off course. No matter the root cause, the Russian’s muted reactions make it clear they are as emboldened as ever to continue testing the limits of the rules-based system.
That brings me to my second example: Israel. It was convenient for the United States when Israel reshaped the security landscape of the Middle East by decimating or seriously degrading Iran’s regional proxy network, including Hamas (at a tremendous and increasing humanitarian toll), Lebanese Hezbollah, and the Houthis in Yemen. Then, of course, there were Israel’s (and the United States’) strikes on Iran itself, including its nuclear facilities. It was far less convenient, however, when this week, Israel launched a unilateral airstrike to assassinate Hamas’s political leadership in Qatar. Qatar has a complicated set of relationships across the region, but it has been a mediator between Israel and Hamas and host to Al Udeid Air Base—the largest U.S. military installation in the region. What the United States knew and when we knew it is unclear, but the Trump administration’s rare rebuke of Israel suggests that it sees the risks when countries ignore rules or conventions, take matters into their own hands, and act unilaterally at others’ expense.
Russia and Israel are not the only ones pushing the envelope when it comes to the use of force. Last week, the United States struck a boat which President Donald Trump claimed was transporting drugs “heading to the United States,” killing all 11 people onboard. (There are reports that the boat had already turned away.) The strike, arguably the most forceful example of Trump’s aspiration to assert hemispheric dominance, was notable in its treatment of alleged drug smugglers as combatants of war versus targets of law enforcement. The United States is not at war with Venezuela; drug smuggling has not historically received the same treatment as imminent national security threats; and Congress did not authorize such an action.
In a letter to Congress, Trump argued that the United States was compelled to act in self-defense, as thousands of Americans die annually from drug overdoses. Self-defense, however, is usually a rationale when there is an imminent threat or actual harm. Is this action the start of a sustained policy to employ lethal force against suspected drug traffickers outside U.S. borders, bringing new meaning to “the war on drugs”? And how would the United States respond if Russia, China, or another opportunistic power used a similar premise to strike a vessel in the Black Sea, Taiwan Strait, or elsewhere? The risks of retaliation, imitation, and contagion are not so easily dismissed.
That is the real Hobbesian peril. Each of these actions can be seen as an isolated instance, but if one or two or three countries take kinetic action unilaterally, it risks creating a permission structure where others feel there are no guardrails to constrain them. We could see a more widespread undermining of the rules-based system, including around the centerpiece of the post-World War II system: constraints on the use of force.
Admittedly, maintaining the rules-based system can be an expensive and, at times, fraught endeavor. A core proposition of Trump’s thinking on American foreign policy is that the United States got sucked into “forever wars” and did not receive adequate compensation for serving as the world’s de-facto policeman during the post-Cold War era. There is a grain of truth in Trump’s assessment, even if the manner in which he challenges the old order comes with significant costs itself.
As the United States’ commitment to upholding the rules-based international system frays, we may unshackle ourselves from burdensome norms and exercise power more swiftly and unilaterally than before. But the same could well hold true for our allies, competitors, and adversaries alike. Left unchecked, a system defined by jungle rules could end up posing more, not fewer demands for at least some measure of U.S. intervention, given our interests around the world.
The historian Robert Kagan has opined that the liberal international order of the post-World War II era, defined by a rules-based system, was not the natural state of world affairs but an aberration, a fragile and artificial construct, sustained only by deliberate American power. Hobbes would certainly agree, and the jungle can always grow back. While I understand why we might be tempted to live there—as the rent is very cheap—the ecosystem is not particularly hospitable. Just take a look at the first half of the twentieth century.
What I’m reading:
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CFR’s Ted Alden, Matthias Matthijs, Sheila Smith, and Josh Kurlantzick examined how the tariff agenda is weighing on the United States’ closest allies: Canada, the European Union, Japan, Australia, and New Zealand.
- In the Wall Street Journal, Greg Ip analyzed how the Supreme Court’s ruling on tariffs could give Trump broader fiscal authority.
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CFR’s Bruce Hoffman and Farah Pandith reflected on the anniversary of 9/11 and how the terrorism landscape has evolved over the last two decades. (Farah is also featured in this week’s “How I Got My Career in Foreign Policy” series.)
- Epoch AI’s Jamie Sevilla and
Yafah Edelman hosted a deep-dive podcast on “Forecasting AI Progress Until 2040.”
