On Tuesday, President Donald Trump indefinitely extended the United States’ ceasefire with Iran, citing internal divisions in the country.
So what’s the latest? For now, peace talks have stalled as there is little overlap between the United States and Iran’s demands. Traffic in the Strait of Hormuz remains at a screeching halt. Iran has seized two ships near the strait, while the United States continues to enforce a blockade of Iranian ports, directing more than thirty vessels to turn around. Iran’s military capabilities are significantly degraded, yet the New York Times estimates that 40 percent of its pre-war drone arsenal and some 60 percent of its missile launcher capabilities are still intact. Needless to say, that’s enough to continue to wreak havoc on the global economy should Iran choose to do so.
I sat down with my CFR colleagues Steven Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies, and Ray Takeyh, Hasib J. Sabbagh senior fellow for Middle East studies for a wide-ranging conversation on the state of the war, the negotiations, and the political dynamics in Iran.
FROMAN: Let’s start with the ceasefire extension. After setting various deadlines, it has now been indefinitely extended. Did Trump blink first? What are the implications of this extension for any future dealmaking and long-term peace?
COOK: Both President Trump and the Iranian leadership think they are winning, so we have a stalemate over the strait. Trump does not want to lift the blockade until Iran agrees to a certain set of conditions; the Iranians won’t agree. Clearly, the president did not want to return to hostilities so he granted an extension of the ceasefire and said he was awaiting a proposal from the Iranians. So yes, he blinked. The question is whether the blockade will squeeze the Iranians enough that they are forced to be more flexible. I am skeptical given that they are hardliners and have been unwilling to capitulate on the battlefield or the negotiating table (so far).
FROMAN: Iran refused to participate in the last round of peace talks. Trump chalked up the ceasefire extension to the regime’s fractured leadership. How do you assess divisions between civilian leadership and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC)?
TAKEYH: Today, the regime lacks a decisive supreme leader that could impose a consensus on the system. At best we can determine, the country is ruled through some type of a coalition. In time of war, it is not unusual for the military leadership to have a strong voice in any such deliberations. There is a degree of skepticism toward negotiations given that the previous rounds of talks have been disrupted by bombings.
COOK: I have long been skeptical of the “moderates vs. hardliners” argument about the Iranian leadership. You have hardliners and then people who try to sell this hardline to Western leaders by shaving off the rougher edges of Iran’s approach to an issue. There are all kinds of rumors about a split between Ahmed Vahidi who leads the IRGC and Mohammed-Bagher Ghalibaf, the parliamentary speaker who negotiated in Islamabad. If true, I don’t believe it matters all that much. The Iranians have no reason yet to come off of their maximal demands.
FROMAN: I’ve touched on this previously, but Iran could draw one of two lessons. It might feel now more than ever that it needs a nuclear weapon, or it might conclude that weaponizing its geography—the Strait of Hormuz—is enough, at least as a deterrent to further bombings by the United States. Which do you think is more likely? Having taken this alternative source of leverage out for a drive, will Iran agree to abandon its nuclear ambitions?
TAKEYH: There is no doubt that using the strait to both impose costs on the international community as well as extract revenues in terms of tolls on ships has entered Iran’s strategic calculation. Given the difficulty of revamping the nuclear program, it has even gained priority. But that does not mean that the thirty-five-year project of reaching at least the status of a threshold state has been abandoned.
COOK: The Iranians will likely do both. The Strait of Hormuz is now a point of leverage from which they might make money and devote to its nuclear program. And unlike a nuclear weapon, the strait can be used—again and again. At the same time, there is a lesson to be drawn from North Korea. If the Iranians had a weapon, there likely would not have been Operation Epic Fury. Also, without a bomb, the United States could at some future date try to undermine Iran’s control or partial control of the strait.
FROMAN: A goal for the Trump administration is reopening the strait, which was open before the war. Iran has reportedly received its first fee from tolls. Should we expect Iran to continue to weaponize its chokepoint in the future?
COOK: Iran will continue to weaponize the chokepoint to the extent they can. The Gulf states will try alternate routes through pipelines and attempt to build infrastructure around the Strait to carry energy resources to market. That infrastructure would be vulnerable to Iranian attack, however.
FROMAN: The Bab el-Mandeb Strait’s shipping levels are only half of what it was before October 7, 2023. Will shipping in the Strait of Hormuz ever return to pre-war levels?
TAKEYH: The only way, in my view, that the waterways can be restored to their previous status is through concentration of American naval assets for an indefinite period of time.
COOK: The Bab el-Mandeb is a related, but largely separate issue. Iran’s ally, the Houthis, attacked shipping in the Red Sea between November 2023 and the ceasefire in Gaza. They have fired twenty-eight ballistic missiles and large numbers of drones at Israel since the beginning of the war, but have not taken any action to close “the Bab.” The Houthis are different from Hizballah, which has increasingly become an arm of the IRGC. The Houthis have far more autonomy. They could close the waterway but based on their own calculation of interests rather than at the direction of Tehran.
FROMAN: When the war initially kicked off, I noted that few countries would cry tears for the regime and the ayatollah but that the war would ultimately be judged by whether it gave way to a more stable and peaceful region or chaos and conflict. How is the war reverberating around the region at present? Will this draw Gulf countries closer to the United States or push them further away?
COOK: Some Gulf states counseled the president not to end hostilities prematurely because they fear that an Iran that has some leverage over the Strait of Hormuz and retains the ability to fire missiles and drones at them will lead to chronic instability, which will undermine their development model. We are seeing a fracturing in the Gulf. The Emiratis have said they will draw closer to the United States and others, which does not include the Saudis. The Saudis, Qataris, Turks, Egyptians, and Pakistanis (not a Middle Eastern power) have discovered a confluence of interests that they might formalize after the war is over.
TAKEYH: In my view, the idea that the Gulf states are now inclined to side with the United States given Iran’s behavior is exaggerated. The Gulf Sheikdoms’ vulnerabilities have been accentuated and the way they are likely to deal with any postwar situation is to once more try to balance their relations with the United States and Iran. Historically, they have been leery of their northern neighbors but also careful not to antagonize them much. In their estimation, America is unreliable and Iran truculent. This leads me to believe they will side with caution.
FROMAN: From technology to tourism, the Gulf states have sought significant investment for their respective development models. What impact has the war had on Gulf development models so far? What are you watching for?
COOK: I recently wrote a column on this very issue for Foreign Policy. In the piece, I argue that there are now serious questions about the Gulf’s vulnerability to Iran’s missiles and drones. We should expect leaders in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Doha to deviate investments in development toward more robust defense capabilities.
FROMAN: Both the United States and Iran think time is on their side. In some respects, they are both right. The longer this stalemate lasts, the more likely it is that Iran will run out of oil storage capability and have to shut down oil production. Shut-in wells take months to bring back online and, given the age of some of Iran’s wells, Iran might not be able to restore its full capacity. That is a serious source of leverage over Iran. So, in that regard, time is on the side of the United States. On the other hand, keeping the strait open could require a long-term commitment of U.S. naval and air resources at a time when this administration had made clear we need to align our foreign policy objectives with our limited resources. We now have three aircraft carrier strike groups in the Middle East for the first time in decades. It’s hard to imagine we can maintain that kind of presence in the region long-term when we have identified the Indo-Pacific and the Western Hemisphere as high priorities. So, in that regard, Iran has time on its side. It can try to wait out the United States whom it knows has other interests to attend to around the world.
Let me know what you think about the war in Iran and what this column should cover next by replying to president@cfr.org.
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