By Nosmot Gbadamosi
Welcome to Foreign Policy’s Africa Brief.
The highlights this year: Great powers scramble for African infrastructure, elections spur democratic transitions in Senegal and Botswana, and South Africa’s ICJ case against Israel pits the West against the rest, and other major stories from 2024.
Africa Brief will be taking the next two weeks off. The newsletter will return to your inbox on Jan. 8. Happy Holidays! Have feedback? Hit reply to let us know your thoughts.
Trucks loaded with copper prepare to leave Tenke Fungurume Mine, one of the largest copper and cobalt mines in the world, in the southeastern region of the Democratic Republic of the Congo on June 17, 2023.Emmet Livingstone/AFP via Getty Images
U.S. President Joe Biden attempted to revitalize relations with African nations far more than any other American president in decades. More than 20 senior leaders have traveled to the continent under the Biden administration, including first lady Jill Biden, Vice President Kamala Harris, and—finally—earlier this month, Biden himself.
It was a well-intentioned policy that attempted to deal with African nations on an equal footing, but it was one that failed in that ambition, often reverting back to geopolitical moves to countering Russia and China. U.S. President-elect Donald Trump, however, never set foot on the continent during his first term, denigrated African nations as “shithole countries,” and issued travel bans on at least seven of them.
Yet observers in many African nations supported a second Trump presidency, in part because Trump was perceived as upfront and honest, rather than pretending to uphold democratic principles while striking deals with African autocracies.
Biden’s long-awaited visit to Angola, the largest African debtor to China, highlighted why so few Africans believed his administration’s rhetoric on democracy. U.S. policy toward Africa is often lacking in the values-based ideologies that the United States espouses, and the reality of pursuing interests related to China and national security often overrides any interest in human rights. Angola has restricted protests, free speech, media freedom, and rights groups critical of the government.
The country is part of a U.S.-backed rail project known as the Lobito Corridor, which aims to increase the speed of transport of critical minerals used for green technologies. The project “comes straight out of China’s Belt-and-Road playbook” and is “emblematic of Washington’s broader ambitions of de-risking ties with China amid growing concerns over its critical mineral supply chain dominance,” Foreign Policy’s Christina Lu wrote in February.
A Trump administration is likely to continue to support the project, demonstrating that U.S. policy can shift to one focused on trade and investment, which many African leaders prefer. But the project may come far too late, as Beijing has touted value-added minerals production, involving locals in the refining of minerals rather than simply exporting the raw materials.
An effective U.S. policy should also be aware of how African relations with China will change in the future. Projects such as Lobito, involving roads and rails, are the infrastructure of the past—and China is already focusing on the infrastructure of the future.
This year’s China-Africa summit held some pointers, such as when China pledged “small and beautiful” projects prioritizing modernity—everything from green electricity to space travel, nuclear energy, local refining of critical minerals, and internet connectivity.
To illustrate the gap another way: In March and then again in May this year, African subsea cable failures left nations in West, Central and East Africa without internet, including major economies such as South Africa, Nigeria, and Kenya—severely impacting businesses. The past year highlighted Africa’s major need for internet infrastructure.
As Joseph B. Keller correctly predicted in Foreign Policy in early 2023, the “West would be mistaken to overlook the implications of African submarine cable proliferation for modern geopolitical strategies between global powers.”
China has invested in at least four undersea cables systems spanning Africa this year, but there is emerging competition by U.S. tech giants Meta and Google. Other potential capacity-sharing opportunities exist via the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Angola, and West African nations, experts told the Africa Report—referencing some of the countries involved in the Lobito Corridor.
Meanwhile, this year marked a successful expansion for Elon Musk’s private satellite internet service, Starlink, now operating in at least 15 African countries. These include Nigeria; Kenya; Rwanda; Ghana; and the latest deal, struck earlier this month: Cape Verde.
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Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Turkey, and Egypt have vied for influence in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa over the past year. The Gulf states and Turkey have backed opposing factions in conflicts in Sudan, Libya, and Somalia in pursuit of their economic interests. Meanwhile, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban entered the security-for-sale market in Africa, sending money and soldiers to Chad.
The collapse of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria was a boon for Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who has expanded influence across Africa by exploiting rifts and providing weapons in the Horn of Africa elsewhere, such as Nigeria. Turkey has also signed deals with Somalia to deploy troops to a base there for two years in exchange for rights to explore and produce oil and gas in three blocks off the Somali coast.
Meanwhile, Egypt has lent military backing to Somalia’s and Eritrea’s grievances against Ethiopia. It also supports the Sudanese army and its war against the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces. Focusing on the Abraham Accords as a key driver of foreign policy in the region, Trump could also inadvertently grant Egypt free rein to cement its role as a significant player in geopolitics around the Horn of Africa.
In October, Egypt, Eritrea, and Somalia forged an axis of resistance against Ethiopia amid various regional disputes. But last Thursday, Somalia and Ethiopia reached a deal their long-running disagreement over Addis Ababa’s plans to build a port in the breakaway region of Somaliland. Following Turkish-mediated talks in Ankara, Ethiopia agreed to recognize Somalia’s sovereignty, and both nations are to hold “technical talks” in February to reach “mutually beneficial commercial arrangements” that would ensure that Addis Ababa gains sea access.
The deal came hot on the heels of lobbying by former U.S. and U.K officials that Trump would support Somaliland recognition—a major break from U.S. policy and one that would go against the African Union’s stance, which is that such a move would encourage secessionists elsewhere, including in Nigeria and Senegal, and that the situation should instead be resolved internally between Somalia’s and Somaliland’s leaders.
People watch as fighters of the Sudan Liberation Movement, a rebel group active in Sudan’s Darfur State, attend a graduation ceremony in the southeastern Gedaref state on March 28. AFP via Getty Images
What is perhaps the biggest hunger crisis in the world has largely fallen off the global radar due to conflicts in the Middle East. After more than a year of brutal war, half of Sudan’s 49 million people are estimated to urgently need food aid. Repeated warnings of mass starvation have gone unheeded by Sudan’s warring generals.
Earlier this month, Sudan’s biggest refugee camp, Zamzam, came under fire by the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces, which are also carrying out a campaign that has been described by human rights groups as ethnic cleansing and genocide against non-Arab communities in the country. More than 8 million people have had to flee their homes, putting pressure on neighbors Chad and Egypt.
The conflict has drawn in other regional militias and nations, including Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Russia, and Ukraine amid mounting pressure for global powers to directly sanction the rival generals and the nations arming them.
“The ongoing crisis there has reached catastrophic proportions, yet the international community’s response remains woefully inadequate,” Yasir Zaidan wrote in August. “Yet there is no substantial pressure being applied on the UAE,” one of the countries accused of supplying weapons.
When South Africa filed its International Court of Justice (ICJ) case accusing Israel of committing genocide in Gaza, much of the global south supported its stance. Earlier this month, Ireland joined South Africa’s case and said it would ask the ICJ to “broaden its interpretation of what constitutes the commission of genocide by a State.”
“By daring to take on a radioactive global issue … which animates powerful feelings across the Islamic world and far beyond, Pretoria is once again perceived as heroic,” FP’s Sasha Polakow-Suransky wrote in February.
Despite a historic loss in presidential elections in May in which the ruling African National Congress (ANC) fell short of the 50 percent threshold needed to govern alone, the ANC still has a firm grip on South African politics. And the country’s grand coalition involving the pro-Israel Democratic Alliance is unlikely to shift its tone on Israel.
In November, the South African government allocated funds to its genocide case, setting it up for a potential clash with a new Trump administration.
About 18 elections took place in Africa this year. Amid a surge of military coups, botched elections and anti-government protests, around 77 percent of Africa’s citizens now live in countries where security and democracy has deteriorated over the past decade. The global rise of populism and so-called strongmen has reversed democratic gains in Africa, warned the Ibrahim Index of African governance that was published in October.
At the time of writing, demonstrators continue to protest the contested results of Mozambique’s election in October, with at least 110 people dead as a result. The ruling Frelimo party’s presidential candidate, Daniel Chapo, secured more than 70 percent of the vote for a party that has been in power since the nation gained independence in 1975.
Yet there have been signs of hope elsewhere. Earlier in the year, Senegal’s election could also have taken a very different turn had its courts not rejected the undemocratic overtures of former leader Macky Sall, thus clearing the path for Bassirou Diomaye Faye, 44, to become Africa’s youngest democratically elected leader.
And in November, Botswana’s young voters kicked out the ruling Botswana Democratic Party, ending more than half a century of one-party rule and giving many young Africans hope that they could expel more of the continent’s unaccountable old-guard governments.
